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DIALOGUE

BETWEEN

A YOUNG GENTLEMAN


AND

A DIVINE.

BY THE REV. J. B. McMAHON,
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AND A DIVINE.

Gent.—Having frequently met, in the most refined

ERRATA.

Page 9—line 5—for “*rationalis*” read “*ratiocinantis*.”

line 15—for “*antecedents*” read “*antecedent*.”

line 17—for “*antecedents*” read “*antecedent*.”

line 21—for “*exceeds*” read “*exceed*.”

line 22—for “*concede*” read “*conceive*,”

Page 38—line 10—for “*or it is*” read “*or is it*.”

of the human soul, when not restrained, within their due limits, can exceed her powers. Speculative and practical Atheism are the result of false philosophy or the immediate consequences of pride and folly ; as it is written that “ the fool said in his heart, there is no God, they became corrupt and abominable,” surely, because having sought after corruption they have imbibed its infection ; and “ they became abominable,” because they were inimical to God himself, to the prince, or ruling powers sanctioned by the order of God, and to the peace, stability, order and harmony of civil society. Wherefore, it becomes the duty of every true philosopher, of every member of the community, to expose the folly and madness

A DIALOGUE
BETWEEN A YOUNG GENTLEMAN
AND A DIVINE.

Gent.—Having frequently met, in the most refined societies, a certain class of Gentlemen, who, both in principle and practice, deny the existence of a supreme being : and who, notwithstanding, are remarkable for much talent and deep philosophical research ; I beg, Sir, you will condescend to instruct me by such proofs and arguments as will enable me, at least, to defend my own principles against such practical and refined infidelity.

Div.—My dear Sir, 'tis a melancholy reflection, 'tis nevertheless an intuitive truth, that the passions of the human soul, when not restrained, within their due limits, can exceed her powers. Speculative and practical Atheism are the result of false philosophy or the immediate consequences of pride and folly ; as it is written that “ the fool said in his heart, there is no God, they became corrupt and abominable,” surely, because having sought after corruption they have imbibed its infection ; and “ they became abominable,” because they were inimical to God himself, to the prince, or ruling powers sanctioned by the order of God, and to the peace, stability, order and harmony of civil society. Wherefore, it becomes the duty of every true philosopher, of every member of the community, to expose the folly and madness

of those, whose perverted principles, under the specious title of refined philosophy, would lay the axe at the root of civil liberty and confound the world's harmony.

To prove by a chain of metaphysical demonstrations, the existence of a supreme being or of God, to those who are become fools by their own wisdom, would be an abuse of reason, and a loss of time and labor. Because in Atheism there is nothing positive ; no man can be an Atheist in his heart—the speculative Atheist dare not reason ; concrete or abstract terms with him, have a paramount signification ; he must speak the language of the passions for the indulgence of which he pleads ; and forcing himself to believe that there is no God to punish his guilt, because he would have it so, he forces himself to deny the clearest positive proofs to the contrary, because he would not have them so.

Gent.—I have frequently and sadly experienced the truth of your remarks, but you will admit, that the powers of oratory and the charms of eloquence have much force in swaying the passions and wining a prepossession in their favor ; nay, the sophistical ingenuity of the philosopher has, but too frequently given falsehood a fair colour, and set truth at defiance : chiefly when the appeal is made to the vulgar, or to persons of shallow conceptions—wherefore, not content to reason from my own information, on a subject of such depth and magnitude, I considered it expedient and necessary to consult persons more deeply versed in metaphysical disquisitions.

Div.—'Tis highly commendable to make prudence the basis of every virtuous inquiry ; not to depend, too much on our own knowledge ; wisely to examine the end to be obtained and to know ourselves, are axioms of prudence ; not to acknowledge a known truth, such as two and two make four, or that a circle is not a square figure—to permit our reason to be governed by our passions, or swayed by the prejudices of a bad education, by partiality or precipitation, is the extreme of folly and the parent of every vice. Men possessed of such feelings and nourishing such extravagant and unwarrantable sentiments, are not fit members for any society, and should cautiously be avoided ; not to consider the end for which man was created—not to acknowledge the wisdom, the goodness, the omnipotence, and the justice of the Creator, is unpardonable infidelity ; because there is an increate all-wise, eternal and incomprehensible being, to whom man owes his existence, who rewards the good and punishes the wicked and whom we call God. The limited judgement of man not permitting him to fathom the ocean of the divinity of his Creator, is better able to describe than define what he conceives by the term.

Moral proofs of the existence of God.

All nations, both ancient and modern, unanimously admit the existence of a supreme being, therefore, &c. proved.—Seneca, Epis. 117. “ You can infer that
 “ there are Gods, because it is a fixed opinion in the
 “ hearts of all, nor has there been any nation so
 “ lawless and immoral as not to admit the existence of

“ the Gods.” “ There is no nation,” said Tully, “ so
 “ rude or barbarous, which, though they were igno-
 “ rant, what God they should have, still knew they
 “ should have some God.” The Mexicans, Peruvians,
 Brazilians, Savages of the North America and others,
 agree with the ancients in that belief. You will say,
 that many nations have admitted a plurality of Gods,
 but to admit polytheism is equivalent to a denial of
 the existence of God—therefore, &c. I distinguish the
 minor, to admit polytheism is equivalent to a denial
 of the existence of God ; considered as respecting
 man’s salvation, I grant it, respecting the acknow-
 ledgement of some supreme being, I deny.

The existence of God is proved from the law of nature.

All nations acknowledge that certain actions are
 good, and certain evil, that virtue and vice are oppo-
 site to each other ; this is a universal law, not coming
 from man, but from God—therefore, &c.

From Physics.

If a Creator of matter be admitted, the existence
 of God must necessarily follow—but a Creator of
 matter cannot be denied without an absurdity, because
 matter did not create itself, nor was it formed by
 chance—therefore, &c.

“ Créer la matière, ce n’est point la prendre où elle
 “ n’était pas, c’est lui donner l’être qu’elle n’avait
 “ pas ; quand nous produisons une pensée ou un
 “ mouvement, nous ne les prenons point, mais nous
 “ les mettons où ils n’étaient pas, l’essence du pou-
 “ voir actif et de faire exister, ce qui n’existoit pas.
 “ Lorsque mon âme remue mon bras, elle lui donne

“ une situation ou une qualité qu'elle n'a pas.”—D. Borgier, *Traité de la Relig.*

Arguments from the formation of the human body, &c.

Man was formed in the womb of his mother, but by whom? was it by himself, or by his mother, or by chance, or by God? but he cannot be said to have formed himself, neither was he formed by his mother, nor by chance—he was therefore formed by God—proved. He was not formed by himself, because existence is prior to action—not by the mother, because even against her will it sometimes occurs that the child is formed in the womb—neither by chance, which would be an absurdity—he was therefore formed by God—therefore God exists.

There exists an eternal, independent and necessary being, but an eternal, necessary and independent being, is God, or one who exists from the necessity of his own essence—therefore, God exists.

Demonstration—Either there exists an eternal being, or all beings which do exist were at one time in a state of nonentity, but the latter is revolting to common sense. Therefore there exists an eternal being—therefore God exists.

“ L'être par lui-même est le plus être de tous les êtres : on ne peut rien lui ajouter : il est donc dans la suprême perfection, car l'être et la perfection ne sont qu'une même chose, et ne sauraient convenir au néant.”—Fénélon.

From the laws of motion.

Whatever is put in motion is moved by another, either, therefore, it is put in motion by an immovea-

ble mover, or by a power which is itself moved by another; in order, therefore, that a procession may not be given *ad infinitum*, we must come to the prime mover, who moves and is moved by none, and that prime mover is God—therefore God exists.

The existence of an all-wise being, is invincibly proved by the fulfilment of the prophecies—by the miracles performed—by the harmony, conservation and inexplicable organization of the visible world. Folly and the desire of gratifying the passions must yield to the above arguments. They are sufficiently conclusive against the stupidity of the Academics, the absurdities of the Manicheans and Epicureans, the impiety of Spinosa and the madness of John Berkley and the immaterialists who doubt of their own existence, or whether they are the children of their mothers. Such are the sad extremes to which pride and folly are wont to lead men.

Gent.—I readily admit the strength and truth of your demonstrations, which cannot be questioned by any man of sense or understanding: are there not, however, some demonstrative truths, concerning which, even the learned have not agreed? Is it not therefore reasonable, in such cases, to suspend our judgement and hold in doubt, at least, the things we cannot comprehend?

Div.—Man is undoubtedly a mystery to himself; he cannot, moreover, by the strictest analysis decompose all the essential parts of matter, to shew them in their first elements; the hyperbolical curve incessantly approaches its asymptotes, though it cannot touch them, as is seen by Mathematical

demonstrations. Metapysicans do not perfectly agree amongst themselves respecting the manner the soul of man is united to his body. To deny, therefore, the knowledge of a supreme being, of ourselves, of matter, &c. &c.--because there is something respecting each which we do not comprehend, would be the extreme of folly and madness ; this conclusion is alone sufficient to expose the absurdity of immaterialism and scepticism. In a moral point of view, 'tis but reasonable to suspend our assent to a proposition until we discover some positive truth, on which we can safely build, and from which we can draw just conclusions ; for example to the proposition, $2 \times 2 = 4$ I readily give my assent ; but if told that $2 \times 4 \times 6 \times 8 = 20$ I suspend for a moment my assent to that proposition, until by the quantities which I have known, I discover an agreement or disagreement, with those which I had not known.

'Tis the province of the Sceptic and Sciolist, who doubt of their own existence, to doubt of a self-evident proposition, or of those evident demonstrations ; a philosophical doubt, perfectly excludes Scepticism, but can only be referred to speculative opinions.

That there exists from eternity a supreme being, whom we call God, is proved from reason and revelation ; this forms the first article of the Christian's creed. He is no Christian or Philosopher who can call this truth in question ; but should rather be considered the common enemy of mankind, who pleads for the indulgence of his sensual appetite, at the expence of reason, religion and morality.

Gent.—From your mode of reasoning, which cannot be invalidated by the subtilties or sophistry of the Atheist ; I feel sufficiently convinced, that an omnipotent, independent and primary cause, does undoubtedly exist. The truth of which, I have constantly endeavoured to defend against the false reasoning of our modern philosophers, who, as you observed, are wont to make the gratification of their sensual appetite, their sole rule of action. I now beg to be informed concerning the properties, or what are generally called the attributes of that all-wise and eternal cause, whom we call God.

Div.—By a divine attribute is understood, in a strict sense, that which flows from the divine essence, and is determined thereby, or a perfection purely simple, *simpliciter simplex* of God, absolutely and necessarily predicable by a mode of adjacent form. They are divided into absolute, as the simplicity, eternity, &c. &c. of a God, and relative ; into affirmative and negative. Amongst the divine attributes are principally numbered, unity, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immensity and immutability.

Gent.—Is it not laid down as an axiom that, in divine things, all are the same ?

Div.—That axiom is expressed as follows :—*Omnia in divinis sunt eadem ubi not obstat relationis realis oppositio*—the sense of which is that all the divine attributes are really identified with the divine essence, and really identified with each other ; except those which are relative *ad intra*, between which there is an opposition of relation, such as the paternity and filiation, these are identified with the divine essence,

and with the other attributes, but really distinct between themselves, which distinction is not real according to the major or strictest sense of the term, nor is it a formal or model distinction, but may be called virtual or of refined reason, *rationis rationalis cum fundamento in re*.

Gent —Since God is one, I cannot clearly conceive how unity can be reconciled with a plurality of persons.

Div.—The immensity of God does not exclude his ubiquity; neither does a unity of essence exclude a plurality of persons.

Gent.—Do not unity and trinity, in the same entity, involve a contradiction?

Div.—I distinguish the antecedents; unity and trinity; taken or considered in the same sense, respecting the same thing; I grant the antecedents, in the same thing taken diversely, I deny the antecedent respecting the tri-unity and uni-trinity of God; Unity is considered to refer to the divine essence, and trinity to the divine person, which, though it exceeds the powers of the human intellect to concede, is in no sense contrary to reason: all the arguments to the contrary are solvable.

St. Augustin in his first book against Maximinian, said, "the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are "one, on account of the same individual nature;" and book 2d. Ch. 7. he said, "hold with the Catholic "faith, that the Father is not he who is the Son, nor "the Son he who is the Father, but that the Father "is God, and the Son is God, yet both together are "not two Gods, but one God."

Thus the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God ; yet there are not three Gods, but one God in the persons of the same individual nature and substance.

Gent.—What is understood by a divine procession ?

Div.—A divine procession, or *processio ad intra in divinis*, is a production or emanation of one from another, so a river is said to proceed from its source. Two of which processions are in God. First by the intellect by which the Son proceeds from the Father, the second from the will by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. This divine truth, on which our salvation depends, cannot be called in question, as having been revealed to man by the author of truth. The Sabellions, the Arians, the Macedonians, the Socinians, the Trinitarians, the Mahometans, are principally those who have impugned this sacred doctrine.

Gent.—Are there not certain ways or rules given by which we can be assured of the truth of a proposition ?

Div.—A certitude is distinguished in three ways, viz : of the object, of the motive, and of the subject. A certitude of the object is the necessity or immutability of the thing in itself which is called intrinsic. A certitude of the motive is the force or prevalence of an argument which moves us to give our assent. A certitude of the subject is the firm adhesion of the mind to some truth, wherefore called a certitude of adhesion. There are certain degrees of certitude, such as moral, physical and metaphysical. Evidence given from the testimony of men, is said to be

morally certain—because according to a prudent judgement it cannot be false.—Thus I am morally certain there is such a City as New York, though I have never been there. A physical certitude is that which, according to the common law of nature, cannot be false. Thus I am physically certain that the sun will rise over the horizon on to-morrow. A metaphysical certitude is that which depends on the extraordinary and absolute power of God and cannot be false. Such is the certitude of our faith, which depends upon the truth of divine Revelation. These three species of certitude, viz : physical, metaphysical and moral, which exclude every doubt, equally depend upon necessary and immutable principles—and in that respect are equal ; truth is simple and admits of no degrees of comparison. They have their different terms, from the manner in which they are employed. Some as metaphysical respecting the first principles or essence of things ; others as physical as respecting the laws of nature—more as moral, which respect the moral laws by which we are wont to be governed.

Gent.—Are not the terms of certain propositions, when sophistically thrown into a syllogistic form capable of embarrassing the honest research of the inquirer and turning him from the truth.

Div.—'Tis no hard matter to deceive, by syllogistic forms, those who are not well versed in dialectics, but the terms of all propositions must be invariably the same. The subject, the predicate and the copula, are the terms of a proposition—ex. gr. God is just. In this proposition, God is the subject, just is the

predicate or attribute and is the copula. In all ratiocination, three things are principally to be distinguished, viz: the antecedent, the consequent, and consequence—ex. gra. every virtue is commendable, but diligence is a virtue, therefore, diligence is commendable. In the above syllogistic form, the two former propositions are called the antecedent, the word, *therefore*, which is the connection between the antecedent and the consequence, is called the consequent; the last proposition or the result of the former is called the consequence. A syllogism made up of three propositions has three terms, viz: the great extreme, the less extreme, and the middle term. In the above syllogism, the great extreme is the attribute of the conclusion, *sil. commendable*, the less extreme, is the subject of the conclusion, *sil. diligence*, the word *virtue*, is the middle term. The propositions of a syllogism are called the major, the minor and the conclusion; propositions are true in a formal sense when concrete names, whether substantive or adjective, are made the predicates to concrete substantives; God is just, God is a spirit, also, when attributes, in the abstract, are made the predicates of concrete substantives; thus God is justice, God is wisdom; these are ordinarily true in an identical or material sense. Hence it can be concluded that the following proposition is undoubtedly false, viz: God understands by the intellect, but the intellect and the will in God are the same, then God understands by the will. Here the terms intellect and will, are taken equivocally; in the major, the term *intellect* is taken

formally, and in the minor materially or identically, and in the conclusion, formally.

But from one of the premises taken only in an identical sense, a formal conclusion cannot be drawn ; one of the premises should contain the conclusion, and the other specify the thing contained.

Gent.—Which are the sources from whence, as from principles, all theological arguments are drawn ?

Div.—They are as follows : 1. The Holy Scriptures ; 2. Tradition and miracles ; 3. The authority of the Sovereign Pontiffs ; 4. The authority of councils ; 5. The constant usage and practice of the church ; 6. The authority of the Holy Fathers ; 7. The authority of universities and canonists ; 8. Natural reason ; 9. The authority of Philosophers and Civilians ; 10. The authority of sacred and profane history, and of chronology.

Gent.—What kind of conclusion is deduced from the authority of the Sovereign Pontiffs ?

Div.—No more weight is to be given to what the Sovereign Pontiff declares, as a private doctor, than to the decision of any other private doctor ; but when the Sovereign Pontiff, at the head of a council, or (as we say) *ex cathedra*, decides on matters of faith or morals, then I say, notwithstanding what the Gallicans or other moderns can say to the contrary, that his decisions are certain and infallible.

Gent.—How are we to consider propositions with regard to their general utility ?

Div.—Propositions respecting their use, are differently considered ; when a proposition is used to express or explain the nature of a thing, 'tis then

called a *definition*—when to divide a whole into its parts, 'tis called a *division*—when it expresses a manifest truth, 'tis an *axiom*—when taken to contain any general truth, 'tis called a *principal*—when it serves to demonstrate other propositions, 'tis called a *lemma*—when it declares some property of an object, as that a triangle is equal to two rectangles, 'tis called a *theorem*—when it expresses some operation concerning something to be done as a triangle being given, 'tis required to described another equal to it, 'tis then called a *problem*—when it evidently follows from a proposition before demonstrated, 'tis called a *corollary*, or it subjoins a further explanation to another proposition, and is called a *scholium*.

Gent.—I have reason to acknowledge myself indebted to your generosity, for the developement of such a fund of useful knowledge, to which I have been heretofore, for the greater part, a stranger ; I would now be informed how it can be proved, that the prescience of God is not an argument against his goodness, in giving man a free will which he foresaw he would abuse ; what God has foreseen to happen, must necessarily happen, and the foreknowledge of God is, therefore incompatible with the liberty of man ?

Div.—The prescience of God is his knowledge of future events—future is two fold, necessary and contingent ; an indifferent cause is two fold, natural and free, some are contingent from their nature, such as wind, rain, &c. some free, as those which proceed from a free will ; passive indifference is peculiar to inanimate beings ; active indifference is reasonable ; 'tis a privilege of self determination, the foundation

of liberty in all intellectual beings; this power of self determination is the free gift of God to man, which, were he not to enjoy, what reward could he merit? by what laws could his transgressions be punished? but it is supposed that what God saw was to happen must necessarily happen, hence, &c.; 'tis by no means because God saw the event that it happens or will happen, but because it was to happen he foresaw it. Cicero, in his second book *de divinitate*, in order to assert the freedom of man, denied the prescience of God; on the contrary, John Huss, in order to maintain the prescience of God, denied the liberty of man; I now answer that argument by distinguishing the antecedent; then I say, what God foresaw, was to happen necessarily by an absolute necessity, and of consequence, I deny the antecedent—what God foresaw was to happen by a hypothetical necessity, I grant. The prescience of God is then intrinsic of our free will, and as the bare knowledge of future events is naturally posterior by the futurity of the thing foreseen; for things are supposed future before they are seen by the prescience which is of vision; therefore they are seen because they are future, but they are not future, or to happen because they are seen: malevolence and goodness, power and mercy, are attributes which exclude each other, it would be impossible that such a being could exist; but says the Deist, “if God be good, how can he permit moral evil.” All the works of God declare his goodness: this I know, 'tis infidelity in man not to acknowledge his goodness; but why he has permitted moral evil I do not pretend to know. But here the Deist, in

charging the deity with malevolence, makes a voluntary sacrifice of what he does know, and what he might still know, in order to seek after that which is not given to man to know, and which is not necessary for him to know.

Nothing can be more absurd than to assert that a being sovereignly good, is obliged to avert all evil : evil consists in some defect and can be no positive existing being, 'tis but the negative of order or goodness, and like the term nothing, has no properties. To oblige God to create beings without any essential defects, would be a creation of beings essentially perfect, which is impossible : to create man and endow him with a free will or power of self-determination, though he were to abuse it, is perfectly reconcilable with the divine goodness. The abuse of this liberty proves its excellence, nothing that is bad can be abused, nor the abuse of that which is good make it bad in itself ; but the Deist wishes to be informed why he is not an angel, why he is not equal in power to the Almighty, why he cannot indulge the sensual appetite and make it his rule of action without the fear of incurring the displeasure of his maker ; why, he asks, has he permitted moral evil ? The reasoning of St. Augustin on this subject is clear and conclusive ; " if it be asked, why God permitted " the man to be tempted, whose consent to the " tempter he foresaw ; truly I cannot sound the depth " of his counsel, and acknowledge it far beyond my " strength ; there may, perhaps, be some more " hidden cause, which is reserved for better and " more holy men, but yet as far as he gives me to

" know or say, it does not appear to me that man
 " would be deserving of great praise if he lived well,
 " because no one would excite him to live ill."—De
 Gen. ad lit. lib. 11. c. 4, &c.—When, therefore, the
 just profit by the unjust, and the pious by the impi-
 ous, it is said in vain, God would not create those
 whose wickedness he foresaw? Why should he not
 create them when he foresaw that they would improve
 the good. " But if God willed it, they also would be
 " good. How much better has God disposed, that
 " they should be what they wish to be. Yes, but
 " unprofitably; but evil, they are not so with
 " impunity, and in that they are useful to others;
 " though he foresaw that through their own faults
 " they would be evil, he did not desist from creating
 " them, deputing men to the advantage of those
 " whom he had created as a people, who could
 " advance in good, but by the co-operation of the bad;
 " if they were not at all, they would be useful to
 " nothing. Is it a small good that they exist who
 " are useful to God's people, of which people,
 " whoever does not wish to be, he does no more than
 " that he himself should not be of them." Such is
 the sense of mankind of the present day respecting
 man's freedom, those only excepted, who, desirous to
 be called philosophers, have established a wild scepti-
 cism, which is as opposite to philosophy as light to
 darkness; they will tell you that men's actions are
 determined by fate, &c. &c. Such reasoning surpass-
 es folly; fate is merely imaginary—a child of fancy; it
 can convey no idea to the mind—all that can be
 determined of it is the sound; the planets, say they,

have their influence ; in this the moon is remarkable. Such are the reveries of our modern Sciolists. Who can doubt the influence of the moon, not only on the human body but also on all sublunary things ?—but, mighty Sciolists, be so kind as to determine the portion of that influence which can deprive man of his free will or liberty of action. If you do not feel yourselves adequate to that task, cease, I pray, to outrage men's judgments, and shock common sense by your ridiculous absurdities. From the foregoing conclusions, which cannot be invalidated by any mode of argumentation, nor by the scepticism of our would-be philosophers, 'tis evident that all reasoning is lost on the practical Atheist, who feigns to deny the existence of his creator ; and on the Deist, who denies his superintending power. They are inimical to the established order of things, and consequently to the peace and order of civil society.

Gent.—How is the divinity of Christ proved against the Arians, the Socinians, &c ?

Div.—The Divinity of Christ, the son of God, is sufficiently attested by St. John in his Gospel, ch. 1. Ver. 1. against the Socinian and his hundred objections, and against all those who impugn that sacred doctrine. No possible argument can invalidate the truth of what St. John has there given down. “ In
“ the beginning was the word, and the word was with
“ God, and the word was God ; all things were made
“ by him,” &c. Ch. 1. v. 1. 'Tis also proved by what I have heretofore demonstrated concerning the existence of God, wherein it has been shewn that the three divine persons are of the same nature and

substance ; hence 'tis manifest that divinity cannot be attributed to one of the persons and denied to the other, without implying a contradiction, since it has been proved that the three divine persons have the same essence, and their attributes identified. Thus, what is once clearly proved to be true, cannot obtain a higher place in the scale of certitude by a thousand additional proofs to the same effect. The Socinian makes it a rule to object whatever he finds impervious to his reason ; in this he has rejected reason itself.

Gent.—Did not the Eutichians teach that after the Son of God, the divine and human natures became identified so as to form but one nature, as water when changed into wine.

Div.—Eutiches, who governed a monastery near Constantinople was not a man of profound learning ; he was not a dialectician ; he imagined, like Meslorius, that by admitting two natures in Jesus Christ, two persons should be admitted by a necessary consequence ; he must have been ignorant that the term *Christ* is a concrete noun, signifying a person and not a nature ; but concrete nouns cannot be multiplied, except their supposites be multiplied ; and the supposites being multiplied, the substantial form should be multiplied ; thus we cannot say two Christ, &c. though in the Trinity there be three supposites or persons ; we cannot say three Gods for the same reason ; because the three persons are identified by their essence, as one substantial form. The errors of Eutiches sprung from a false conception of the words of St. John. *and the word was made flesh.*—St John, 1. The true meaning of which we find given by St.

Paul, 11 Phil. Who being in the form of God, made himself as of no account, assuming the form of a servant. Here 'tis sufficiently clear, that being in the form of God, he did not divest himself of his divinity, by assuming the form of a servant. The Apostle concisely proves the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The doctrine of the incarnation is most solidly and clearly proved from the letter of St. Leop. to Flavian, of which the following is an extract: "The divine and human natures remaining
 " each entire, were united to one person, in order that
 " the same mediator could die, being otherwise
 " immortal and imperishable; one nature is not
 " altered by the other; the same who is true God is
 " true man; the word and the flesh, have the operations which are proper to each. The Scripture
 " equally proves the truth of the two natures. He
 " is God, since it is said in the beginning was the
 " word and the word was God. He is man, since
 " it is said the word was made flesh and dwelt
 " amongst us," &c. Suffice it then, to remark here, that the errors of Eutiches mainly sprung from a false interpretation of the sacred text, which is yet the cause of numberless sects and extravagant opinions of modern innovators, who disturb the religious harmony of the Christian family at the present day. Luther taught that the humanity of Christ was of the divine nature, to which he consequently attributed immensity and ubiquity. "We believe, said he," in his sermon on the Lord's supper, "that Christ, according
 " to his humanity, is placed above all creatures, and
 " fills all things"; hence he concludes that Christ is really in the sacrament: such a paradox is worthy of

the author, whose reforming spirit could neither be governed by reason, nor confined within the limits of prudence or of common decency. "If," says he, "the body of Christ be in all places, well I shall devour and guttle it in all taverns, from all plates, bottles and glasses." He then answers to the tacit objection. "Hear you hog, you fanatical dog, you silly ass, though the body of Christ be in all places you shall not devour nor guttle it." He gives for reason, though the body of Christ be in all places, yet it cannot be received in all places, and concludes; "now I remit you to your hog-sty or to your dung-hill." Christ, as man, was not present at the death of Lazarus since he said, John. 11. Lazarus is dead, and I rejoice on your account, that you may believe I was not there. Such, however, are the paradoxes and anomalies of the impudent and immoral Islebian, the patriarch of our modern reformers. Calvin in his first book of Inst. ch. 17. said, "whence I pray, the stench in the carcase, which is both putrified and opened by the heat of the sun, all see it caused by the rays of the sun, yet no man says that the rays themselves are fetid on that account." By the above solicism, the folly and blasphemy of John Calvin, of reforming memory, is demonstrated. What comparision, I beg to know can there be between the sun, a heap of inert matter, and the omnipotent and intelligent cause by which it is put in motion? Still he would insinuate, not only that God concurs with man to commit evil, but irresistibly compels him thereto. In his second book of Inst. is found the following blasphemous

language. " I here omit that universal motion of
 " God, from which all creatures have that they
 " subsist, and the efficacy of doing any thing; I
 " speak of that special action only, which appears
 " in each wicked sect; hence we see that it is not
 " absurd to attribute the same wicked act to God, to
 " Satan, and to Man." Here God is made the sole
 cause of the act. Satan and man are only his agents.
 Such doctrine is an insult to sense and reason, and a
 blasphemy against the God of Heaven. St. Augustin
 thought it less impious to deny Divine Providence
 than to make God the author of evil. "*Aut divinam*
 "*providentiam non usque ad hæc ima portendi, aut*
 "*mala omnia dei voluntate committi utrumque impium*
 "*sed majus posterius.*"—B. 1. on order Ch. 1st.

That man," said Eusebius, of Cæsarea, " is to be
 " accounted impious, and of all men the most
 " wicked, who thinks that by the creator of the
 " universe, some are impelled to adultery, others to
 " rapine, and others to other vices; whence it would
 " follow; that these are not sins, or that the creator
 " is the cause of sin; hence not the man but the
 " creator himself will be the sinner, than which
 " doctrine nothing more wicked can be imagined."

" But" said Calvin, " all the sins of the faithful are
 " venial, not because they do not deserve death, but
 " because, through the mercy of God there is no
 " condemnation in those who are in Jesus Christ;
 " because they are not imputed." Here Calvin, not
 content with blaspheming against the majesty of God,
 begins to attack christain morality; no sin, the most
 abominable, but can be venial in Calvin's saints whilst in

others the least sins become capital. Let the saints, then, be guilty of every species of immorality, such cannot be imputed, they are saints!!! 'Tis no wonder that all kinds of licentiousness would prevail amongst the deluded of the arrogant mortal, who propounded such a doctrine. Lucifer himself could not devise a more effectual plan to destroy religion and disturb the peace of nations, than by making it appear that God himself was the author of sin, and that no crime could be imputed to those who called themselves saints. From the above exposition of the rashness and folly of those men who, depending on their own judgements, have caused many to stray from the Church of Christ, and from the rules of reason and religion, it can be concluded that it is prudent and necessary to consult men of wisdom, of piety and experience, not only on such passages of the sacred Scriptures as are not familiar to private interpretation, but also on the determined sense of such metaphysical terms as may involve numberless contradictions and absurdities, when not properly understood or arranged in a sentence. The Sabellians, by identifying the terms *nature* and *person*, impugned the doctrine of the most holy trinity; they agreed as follows: nature and person are the same, but in God there is but one nature, therefore but one person. The Arians use the same mode of reasoning to prove three natures in God; the Nestorians the same, to prove two persons in Christ; the Eutichians reasoned after the same manner, to prove that in Christ there was but one person and one nature, as we before explained; hence the danger of misapplying the terms, or not determining their proper meaning.

Gent.—I have some time ago, in a treatise on the Soul, by *De la Métrie*, read the following passage which is found in the 5th Ch. and which I assure you surprised me a good deal, because I was always led to believe that the principle which is in us, which we call the Soul, was not composed of matter—'tis the following: "In bodies we know of no other principal
 " than matter, and we do not observe the faculty of
 " thinking but in bodies; on what foundation then,
 " can an ideal being be established, which is dis-
 " avowed by all the knowledge we have."

Div.—From the above mode of reasoning, there could be no sensible sign or effect except of the thing which is placed before our eyes; therefore, on incorporate God, the creator and ruler of the world, could exist; therefore, the causes of the phenomenons of nature are before our eyes, all which are so many absurdities. Be not therefore surprised at the dreams of *De la Métrie*—he is yet more consistent than Locke, in his treatises on the human understanding, wherein he laughs at reason, and leaves to the world a work of contradictions, as a standing memorial of human extravagance, and of human imperfection. "The
 " pure spirit," i. e. God, said he, book 2. ch. 23.
 § 28. being only active, and pure matter simply
 " passive, we can believe that the created spirits,
 " which are both active and passive participate of
 " one and the other." Now, according to John Locke, a pure spirit is immaterial or not solid; pure matter is solid—wherefore, if a pure spirit can participate of both together, it can be at the same time solid and not solid, which is rank nonsense. And in the book 4.

ch. 3, he said, " God cannot make a substance solid
 " and not solid at the same time."—*Mentita est*
iniquitas sibi.

Proposition.

The human soul, or that principle which is in us, which has the power of thinking, reasoning and judging, is simple and devoid of matter; proved.—1st. because, according to Locke, matter is essentially solid, composed of many parts and susceptible of division; but our thoughts cannot be the affections of that which is essentially solid, for since modes, according to Locke, depend on the things they modify, a modification purely simple, cannot depend but on that which is purely simple and every way devoid of composite parts—therefore, &c. —2d. " Un être est
 " distingué d'un autre être quand l'idée que j'ai de
 " l'un est différente de celle que j'ai de l'autre,
 " —Or, l'idée que nous avons de l'étendue ren-
 " ferme l'idée de plusieurs parties, de longueur,
 " de largeur et de profondeur, et elle exclue l'idée
 " de pensée et de sentiment, donc ce qui est étendue
 " est distingué de ce qui pense; de même l'idée
 " que nous avons de la pensée ne renferme point
 " l'idée de l'étendue et même l'exclut. Ainsi l'âme
 " étant en nous l'être qui pense, n'est pas l'être qui
 " est étendue, et le corps étant en nous l'être éten-
 " due n'est pas l'être qui pense, parceque l'idée de
 " l'un n'est pas l'idée de l'autre."—Dumarsais *on the*
distinction between the body and the soul.—3d. We
 can have the idea of things past, present, and to come;
 the idea of a circle, a square, and a triangle; the
 idea that all the parts are equal to the whole, that
 there is no effect without a cause, &c. The above

operations are absolutely incompatible with that which is composed of parts, they are ideas which exclude each other—the mind or soul is therefore simple, and perfectly devoid of matter.—Q. E. D. ; but, says the materialist, we cannot analyse all the constituent parts of matter, there are consequently many whose properties we do not know ; I grant the objection—its full weight turns against the materialist ; why does he from what he knows, attribute to the unknown parts, affections which are incompatible with those already known. I assume that there can be no unknown parts of matter which exclude those we know ; all the known affections of matter can be reduced to three, viz: rest, motion, and figure ; wherefore our thoughts, our judgments, cannot be modifications of matter, if they be not found to consist in either of those three affections, which is not the case ; a judgment which is a simple act of the mind, cannot be said to consist in a state of inaction ; action is opposed to rest and excludes it ; rest is a correspondence permanent in the same place, which cannot agree with our thoughts, our judgments, &c. &c.—2d. Thoughts are not motions of a body ; motion is a successive correspondence in different places. Who will say that love, hope, fear, &c. are a correspondence succeeding to different places.—3d. Our thoughts are not figures of matter ; because a body, such as matter, receives its modifications passively, not so with the mind, whose thoughts are active and free for the most part, I say for the most part, because there is no person who does not feel and perceive that his mind is active in some things, and in others merely passive, *ex. gr.* when it experiences

certain sensible impressions, such as cold, heat, &c. it is then merely passive, having unwillingly experienced or received those impressions; the mind is active in its judgment, reasonings, &c. &c. the idea which we have of the mind is clear and distinct, though imperfect. Hence, as thoughts are not found to consist in form, rest or motion, I conclude they cannot be affections of matter. If thought could be an affection of matter, or of the most minute particle of matter, either it would exist entire in each part and parcel, or one and the same thought would be diffused throughout all the parts—either of which would be an absurdity. The mind, then, is essentially distinguished from matter, and the affections of matter, for this simple reason: because the idea of the mind excludes the idea of matter, and the idea of matter excludes in like manner the idea of the Soul—thus they naturally exclude each other. To make such ideas agree, would be to assert that a thing can exist, or be, and not be at the same time, which is repugnant. Q. E. D.

Prop. The soul is immortal.

All the operations of the mind evidently shew that it is a simple, indivisible and active principle, which cannot be annihilated by any power inferior to that Almighty power which gave it existence; neither can it deprive itself of existence, being of its own nature immortal; it has in itself no principle of dissolution. In reasoning on universal principles, which are its more perfect operations, 'tis independent of the body. Those universal principles, though eternal and immutable, cannot affect any of its senses; hence

it must exist when separated from the body, which separation can only tend to its perfection. "To pretend," says a late author, "that the soul, immortal of its own nature, capable of greater perfections in its highest operations in a state of separation than when united with the body, should be destroyed by Almighty power, is rash and extravagant." The Atheist and materialist, whatever their conceptions may be concerning prejudice or education, cannot adduce a single argument sufficiently conclusive to shew that the desire of immortality is not natural to man. I do freely grant that there are many who, from their impieties and the immorality of their lives, have just reason to expect that punishment which is due to their crimes; to those, the desire of immortality may not be very desirable, but if one man be seen without a leg, another without an arm, and a third without an eye, will it follow that legs, arms and eyes are not natural to man? 'Tis a positive truth that there is nothing here below of a nature capable to satisfy the desires of man, for which evident reason his natural desires are never satisfied, while on the stage of this world, and pressed down with a corruptible body—nothing less than the enjoyment of his creator can satisfy man's natural desires; tis the end for which he received existence, to which all his actions should be wisely directed; and as the mariner who, guided by his compass on the pathless ocean, when assured of his course, takes in by anticipation a portion of that delight and pleasure which he expects to enjoy, when arrived at a well known port; so can the virtuous and the good, who make the end for which

they were created, the magnet of their mortal course, anticipate with joy the eternal reward which an all-wise Creator has reserved for them in another world. The materialist who tells us that virtue is its own reward, would do more justice to his reasoning powers, and more honor to human nature, in attending to the exhortations of the celebrated Bossuet, Bishop of Meaux, from which I take the following extract :

“ Créature quelle que tu sois, et si parfaite que tu te
 “ croie, songe que tu as été tirée du néant, que toi-
 “ même tu n’est rien ; c’est du côté de cette basse
 “ origine que tu peux toujours devenir pécheresse, et
 “ de là éternellement et infiniment malheureuse.
 “ Superbe et rébelle, prenez exemple sur le prince de
 “ la rébellion et de l’orgueil. Voyez ce qu’un seul
 “ sentiment d’orgueil a fait en lui, et de tous ses
 “ sectateurs fuyons, fuyons nous nous-mêmes, ren-
 “ trons dans notre néant, et mettons en Dieu notre
 “ appui comme notre amour.”

“ L’immortalité de l’âme, (said Paschal) est une chose qui nous importe si fort, et qui nous touche de si près, qu’il faut avoir perdu tout sentiment pour être dans l’indifférence de savoir ce qui en est.”

Gent.—’Tis a conclusive proof against what the materialist or others can allege against the immortality of the soul, viz : that a substance cannot be other than immortal, which has neither in itself or in its nature, any principle of corruption nor dissolution. Whoever has common sense will not deny the truth of this—with those who do, ’tis useless to argue, Concerning the union of the soul with the body, have not there been various opinions given? Which do

you find the most tenable, or in what does that union consist, which constitutes what we call a person ?

Div.—Many opinions were given by Theologians and Metaphysicians concerning the union of the soul with the body, which constitutes what Boetius calls “ an individual substance of rational nature,” or a person ; some have imagined that there existed between the soul and the body, a natural and physical action, which they termed a *physical influx* ; but such a system would be evidently opposed to the natural simplicity, and, in a sense, to the activity of the soul, and is therefore to be rejected. Leibnitz would establish a system of what he called “*pre-established harmony*,” which consisted in the idea that the different thoughts of the mind corresponded with the different motions of the body, and the different motions of the body were in their turn consonant to the thoughts of the mind. This hypothetical or automatonical system of Leibnitz, far from being philosophical, is rash and impious, because from the hypothesis of a separation of the soul from the body, the same actions would remain in the latter as before, as well as in the former, until its dissolution in as regular a succession as a watch or clock. Thus, the Colonel of a Regiment, after losing the head by a cannon ball, might still lead his men to the charge, sword in hand, and eventually gain the day. The system of Descartes of “*occasional causes*” consists in shewing that the thoughts of the mind are no more than the occasional causes, freely instituted by God, by the intervention of which he causes certain motions in the body ; likewise that the various motions by which the organs of sense are put in

action, are mere occasions by which God himself creates in the mind, certain thoughts and sensations, all which are performed by certain general and uniform laws; whence it is, that from the motions of the organs, like motions are excited in the body, if there be no obstruction. This system of Descartes was strenuously maintained by Malebranche, on which as it comes next the truth, it can be observed, viz: 1st. That any cause which produces an effect, can be called an efficient, but as a physical cause alone produces really and of itself an effect, 'tis therefore with more propriety called an efficient cause, on which the moral cause immediately depends. Thus he who sets fire to an edifice, is said to be the moral cause of the conflagration which would follow, though it be not he, but the fire which physically destroys the building. 2d. An occasional cause is that which has a contrary effect to what was intended. If for example, by administering medicine to a patient it caused his death, the person who administered the medicine, is by accident the cause of his death, or the accidental cause. An instrumental cause agrees with the moral, inasmuch as they mutually depend on the physical cause; as to the effect, both may be called occasional. It seems to be the opinion of Descartes, that the soul is the moral cause of motion in the body, and the physical cause of its own thoughts, and that the body is the mere occasional cause of the soul's sensations, &c. Tournamine (says a late scientific and accurate metaphysician) who was a true philosopher, and who knew how to confine his imagination within the limits which reason, authorized by religion,

prescribes, takes a peremptory exception against the hypothesis of Descartes, which is not less ruinous to the supposition of Leibnitz, though for him he expressed great veneration, and seemed disposed to adopt his opinion, at least in part. In Leibnitz's opinion, corrected by Tournamine, the soul is left in possession of liberty, activity and self-determination. He states his exception against Descartes in a few words ; neither, says he, the activity of God producing sensations in the soul, correspondent to the motions of the body, and motions in the body, correspondent to the volitions of the soul, nor the mutual reciprocation of these volitions, motions and sensations, constitute a real union of the soul and body. This reciprocation is consequent to the union of the soul, and body dependent on it, not constitutive of it. This reasoning bears no reply, for surely correspondence is not union ; but if the correspondence of Descartes' inventions be not union, the *pre-established harmony* of Leibnitz, though rectified, is not more so—Tournamine felt it, he saw the necessity of assigning some principle, which shews that there is between the soul and body, something more than correspondence and harmony—something more intimate than ideal union, dependent on arbitrary laws ; that a real and effective union, not a union of inhabitation or use, but a union of absolute possession and property ; not such a union as subsists between persons of the same society, or between a body and the space which includes it, but a connection so real and so necessary, that no other soul but mine could inform my body, and no other body than mine, could be informed by my soul. We shall now

pass from Tournamine's hypothesis, which, however plausible, is not satisfactory ; even the vast and comprehensive mind of Bossuet has left the question undecided. There are, said he, three things to be considered in man, the soul separately, the body separately, and both united in one whole. The soul is the principle seat of thought, of conception, of determination, of choice ; either influenced by the motion of the organs or independently of them. The operations of the mind are of two kinds ; the one merely independent of the motions of the organs, and intellectual, by which the body is made subservient to the views and interests of the soul ; the other sensitive, influenced by the organs by which the soul is made subservient to the body. The body is a natural whole, composed of organs fit for different functions, and springs adapted to different motions ; all the parts are so exquisitely contrived, and fitted for mutual defence and assistance, that they open and shut, dilate and contract themselves, recede and return, with astonishing rapidity, ease and aptitude ; there is in them the most perfect correspondence, proportion, symmetry and harmony ; they all tend to one common end and interest, that is, the preservation of each part taken separately, and of the whole collectively. In it there are two principle parts—the heart and the brain, which extend their influence to all and every part, however minute, of the whole frame. From the heart, where the blood is formed, vital heat, strength, nutrition, and vigour are conveyed to every other part ; from the brain, the animal spirit which gives itself motion, is distributed to the whole system. In the heart the

fabrication of the animal spirits begins ; its impetus forcing the blood from the arteries to the extremities, heats the blood, disengages the most subtle particles which it sends to the brain, which perfects them, and remits a sufficient quantity to continue the motion of the heart. Thus these principal parts mutually assist each other in their respective functions, and are indispensably necessary, each to the other ; without the blood which the heart transmits, the brain cannot act, and without the animal spirits which the brain remits, the motions of the heart must cease—it is so of all the other organs and springs of the body ; there is a mutual correspondence, dependence, and tendency to the same end, by which they are all united to the one whole. The different parts of the body are not united merely, because they are contiguous—the head is distant from the feet, nor because they adhere either mediately or immediately to each other. An extraneous substance may adhere to the body ; their union therefore, principally depends on their dependence and assistance in preserving and facilitating their respective functions, and their tendency to the same end, that is, to enable the body to produce within it, and without, all those motions and effects for which it is fitted by its nature, and analogous by its destination,—the body is destined to be the instrument of the soul. After all that has been said respecting the tendency, mutual functions, &c. of the soul and body, by that great man, we find nothing decisive concerning the principle which constitutes their union. To me it appears the most probable, that the union of the soul with the body consists in the

mutual reciprocity of the thoughts of the mind and the motions of the body. Proved—there can be given no specific tie by which an immaterial substance can be joined to a corporeal; union can consist in that alone, which given, one person can evidently consist of two substances, but in every fact, that by the occasion of the thoughts of the mind, motions are excited in the body, and on account of the motions of the body, thoughts arise in the mind, it is that one person consists of two substances. This principle being laid down, the mind and body mutually depend on each other in their affections, by a concurrence of thoughts and motions, so that in this position, neither can be considered independent of the other, i. e. *sui juris*; neither can be complete, therefore not two supposites—therefore, &c. Q. E. D. This union, said the author to whom I have before alluded, is natural, because it is immediately from God, the author of nature, not essential to either soul or body, for they might have existed separately before their union, as they do after its dissolution; they might have been created and destined by their author to other functions; their union is solely and absolutely dependent on his will; for the soul, a spiritual substance, active from its nature, and the body, a composition of material elements, purely passive, have in themselves and independently of the divine will, no connection, no tendency to an union. This last system has the sanction of reason, and is proved by daily experience: for example, when we approach a fire, the sense of heat is excited in the mind by a vibration caused by the particles of heat on the slender fibres

of the body. In like manner, if a wound be inflicted on the body, the mind will immediately be affected with a sense of pain.

Gent.—Though it may not appear philosophic, when there is question of assigning the causes of certain effects, to have recourse to the author of nature as the general cause; but since the union of the mind and body is unquestionably one of those effects which cannot be of a secondary cause, he would appear to me a true christian philosopher, who determines that God alone is the general or sole cause of that union. 'Tis evident that substances so essentially different, cannot be so closely and intimately connected by any particular cause; their connection then, must solely depend on the Almighty cause which gave existence to both; to know this, is wisdom and the essence of true philosophy; by it man comes to a sense of his own nothingness; there are limits assigned to the extravagance of his enquiries and his absolute dependence on this Creator, is most evidently demonstrated. As you have exposed the errors of the materialist, concerning the immortality of the soul, and the different opinions respecting its union with the body; I would now gladly be informed of the powers of the human soul.

Div.—According to St. Thomas, quest. 78, Art. 1. The powers of the soul are five in number, viz: vegetative, locomotive, sensitive, intellectual and appetitive. The vegetative powers are of three kinds: nutritive, augmentative and generative. The locomotive powers are those ordered for motion, as when we move a member or walk, &c. The exterior sensitive

powers are these five—seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting and smelling. The four interior senses are, the common sense by which the operations of the exterior senses are perceived; the phantasm or imagination, by which the appearance or forms of things which are sensible are retained; the estimative, by which we perceive an agreement or disagreement between external objects; the memorative, by which we retain those things which have been received by the estimative. The appetitive power is of two kinds, viz: intellectual and sensitive; these are called animal or material, because they are common to brutes; on the contrary, the intellect, reason, will and memory, are called spiritual powers, because they are proper to man.

Gent.—What is understanding by intellect?

Div.—The word intellect, derived from *intelligendo*, signifies a spiritual cognitive power, inasmuch as it takes in first principles which are known without disquisition. Reason is an intellectual power, because by disquisition it draws conclusions from first principles; hence intellect and reason are not two distinct powers; the will is an intellectual or reasonable power, desirous of what is good, according to the apprehension of the intellect. Its principal acts are, love, intention, consent, choice, complacency, fruition, and desire. The powers of the intellect and the will are so nearly connected, that they often partially concur in their acts; thus, choice and counsel can be said of the two powers, &c. The memory is a power representing the things which we have known before.

Gent.—Is not the memory endowed with some singular qualities or properties, which we cannot describe?

Div.—St. Augustin in the 10th book of his conf. ch. VIII. § 5th. has, sufficiently answered that question, when he said, great is this power of the memory, exceeding great, O! my God; an inward room, spacious and boundless—who can sound the bottom of it? And this is a power of my soul, and belongs to my nature, and I myself am not able to comprehend all that I myself am. The soul then is too narrow to contain itself, so that where it is, what it is, it cannot comprehend. Is it then out of itself? or is it in itself? how then does it not contain or comprehend itself? This is to me a subject of great wonder—I stand astonished at it; and men go a great way to see and admire the heights of mountains, and the vast billows of the sea, and the courses of great rivers, and the compass of the ocean, and the motions of the heavenly bodies, and leave themselves, and wonder not at themselves. Now when I named all these things, I saw them not with my eyes, yet I should not have named them, If I had not then both mountains, and waves, and rivers, and stars, which I have seen and the ocean which I have heard of represented in my memory, as if I had seen them abroad; and yet, when I saw them with my eyes; I did not draw in any of them, nor are they within me, but their images; and I know by which of the senses of the body I received their several impressions. . . . but when I hear that there are three kinds of questions, whether a thing be or not, and of what quality it is, I have indeed within me the images of those sounds by which these words were formed, and I know that the words themselves passed through the air with a

noise, and are now no more ; but as for the things themselves, which are signified by these sounds, I did not meet with them by any of the senses of my body, nor even saw them, but in my own mind ; and I laid up in my memory, not their images, but themselves, which, how or whence they came into me, let them tell that can. We find then, that to learn such things as these, (of which we don't take in the images through the avenues of the senses, but without any images, see them within us as they are in themselves) is nothing else but to bring as it were together by thinking on them, and to take notice by the application of one's mind to them, of such things as were before indeed in the memory, but without union or order, that so being now laid up, as it were at hand in the same memory, where before they lay scattered and neglected, they may the more easily occur to our attention, to which they are now grown to be familiar.

Gent.—While I admire the depth of his researches, and the extraordinary piety of that great man, who is justly stiled a saint of God, and one of the most illustrious doctors of his Church, I cannot but be indignant at the folly and impiety of our modern sceptics, who, understanding so little of themselves, would presumptuously fathom the ocean of the divinity, making every thing subject to the empire of what they call reason, and which is virtually no more than the impulse of their lawless passions ; pray Sir, what is to be said of the nature of our ideas, or their efficient cause ?

Div.—'Twas the opinion of N. Malebranche, who

was born at Paris, on the 6th of August, 1638, and whose sentiments claim much respect, in consequence of his piety and extraordinary literary acquirements, that our ideas of bodies were certain intuitions of the mind, but not its modifications, as representing bodies ; wherefore, he said, we do not see the bodies themselves or in themselves, but in God, in the divine essence, which, as it created the bodies, it contains in a spiritual manner, their essence or extension, which on that account, he calls intelligible extension.—Mal. lib. 3. de inqi C. 7. “ Je croi-,” said he, Rech. de la ver. lib 3. 2 part, Ch. 1. “ que tout “ le monde tombe d'accord, que nous n'appercevons “ pas les objets qui sont hors de nous, par eux “ mêmes, nous voyons le soleil, les étoiles et une “ infinité d'objets hors de nous, et il n'est pas “ vraisemblable, que l'ame sorte du corps et qu'elle “ aille pour ainsi dire se promener dans les cieux “ pour y contempler tous ces objets ; elle ne les voit “ donc point par eux même ; et l'objet immédiat de “ notre esprit, lorsqu'il voit le soleil, par exemple, “ ce n'est pas le soleil, mais quelque chose qui est “ immédiatement uni à notre âme, et ce c'est que “ j'appelle idée. . . . Un autre raison qui peut faire “ penser que nous voyons tous les êtres, à cause que “ Dieu veut, que ce qui est en lui, qui les représente, “ nous soit découvert.” This system, though obnoxious to weighty difficulties, shews the piety of the author and his wonderful sublimity of thought. It was strenuously opposed by A. Arnauld, in his treatise on true and false ideas. “ Mon âme,” said he, “ est capable de voir et voit en effet, ce que Dieu “ a voulu qu'elle vit, or Dieu l'ayant joint a mon

„ corps a voulu qu'elle vit, non un corps intelligible, „ mais celui qu'elle anime.” He does not admit the objective idea of Malebranche, but contends that idea and perception are one and the same thing—his conclusion is not satisfactory. It cannot be denied that perception is a modification of the mind, 'tis the act of an intelligent being, the objects we perceive do not belong to the mind, they are not its modifications. Perception then, and the object perceived, are by no means one and the same thing ; but if it be asked, what is the immediate object of perception ? 'tis not a fair answer to say, that 'tis the nature of perception to perceive its objects ; since the question is not now of perception, but of the objects perceived. If on the other hand, according to the system of Malebranche, we see all objects in God, as in a glass which we have continually before our eyes, it will result that we have our ideas immediately from God, then there is no further room for metaphysical research. But, according to that hypothesis, he should have explained what he would have understood, by *intelligible extension*, which he has not explained, in a matter where the utmost precision is necessary. His system is, notwithstanding, admirably composed, and manifests much erudition and great sublimity of thought.

Prop.—God alone is the efficient cause of our ideas ; proved—either God is the efficient cause of our ideas, or our minds, or our bodies ; but our bodies cannot be said to be the cause of our ideas, as well because our bodies, of themselves, are inert and inactive, as because our ideas are evidently spiritual, and of a nature different from matter ; but that which is more

perfect, (if I may say so) cannot proceed from that which is less so, as from an efficient cause, since here the cause should contain its effect—therefore bodies cannot be the efficient cause of our ideas—the mind cannot be the efficient cause, for either the mind knows the objects, or it does not. If it know the objects, then their formation in the mind is not requisite for the idea of objects is had in order to attain a knowledge of them. If, secondly, the mind has had no prior knowledge of the objects, it can no more form an idea of them, than a painter can draw the portrait of a man whose image or appearance he never saw. For as the will cannot consent to love an object of which it has no knowledge ; neither can the intellect form to itself an idea of that object of which it has no knowledge or cognition ; therefore it remains that God alone is the sole efficient cause of our ideas. Q. E. D. This remark is by way of corollary.

To no purpose are our ears stunned by the doctrines of most learned men ; the noise of words were vain and fruitless, if God were not to guide to our minds his interior light, and stamp them with the knowledge of his truth. *Ergo unus est magister deus qui docet omnem scientiam.* Psal. 93. 10. *Nolite putare*, said *St. Augustin*, *hominen aliquid discere ab homine, admonere possumus per strepitum vocis nostræ ; si non sit intus qui doceat inanis fit strepitus nostræ.*

Whatever can be objected from factitious ideas, against this mode of reasoning, can have no weight in the scale of argumentation, no more than what can be said concerning making God the author of evil thoughts such as theft, adultery, &c. &c. because there are no ideas bad in themselves, or intrinsically ; thus the

idea of theft, adultery, &c. can have no evil intrinsically attached to them as ideas. The christian orators, who deter people from the above vices, must have an idea of them, and certainly they are guilty of no sin on that account.

Gent.—From whence have our ideas their origin, or how are they considered by authors in that respect?

Div.—Why, if we can believe Mr. Locke, (an English author who wrote a treatise on men's minds or understandings, before he acquired a sufficient knowledge of his own) our minds were formed by Almighty God, smoothe as a Billiard table, and without any impression whatsoever.

Gent.—Are we then to hold this opinion, or is it universally received?

Div.—So far from it, that the same author asserts the contrary in the following words: "I avow that
" nature has given to all men, a desire to be happy
" and a strong aversion to misery. These practical
" principles are truly innate, and which, according to
" the destination of every practical principle, have a
" continual influence on all our actions."—On the human understanding, Book 1. Ch. 2. § 3. Now if it be required to demonstrate to others some known truth, we must reason from some principles common to us both; but according to Locke, (even if he were consistent with himself) no common principles are or can be admitted, not even the trite adage, *alteri ne feceris quod tibi fieri non vis*. There are many ideas which cannot be said to have their origin from the senses, either proximately or remotely, such, for instance, are the ideas of spirituals, or of things

merely intellectual ; such as, the idea of God, of our own mind, of good and evil, &c. ; these have surely entered into the mind by none of the senses, either proximately or remotely. This is the opinion of all christian philosophers of note ; Carthesius and Malebranche agree on this occasion ; Mr. Locke himself sometimes joins in that opinion. Bossuet has spoken piously and eloquently on this subject. “ D’où vient donc,” said he, “ que l’impie ne connaît point Dieu, et que tant de nations ou plutôt que toute la terre ne l’a pas connu, puis qu’on en porte l’idée en soi même avec celle de la perfection ? d’où vient cela ? si ce n’est pas par un défaut d’attention et parceque l’homme livré aux sens et à l’imagination ne veut pas ou ne peut pas se recueillir en soi même, ni s’attacher aux idées pures dont son esprit embarrassé d’images grossières, ne peut pas porter la vérité simple.” From all which, it can be concluded that there are many ideas which cannot be said to have their origin from the senses, either proximately or remotely.

Gent.—Are there not certain ideas stamped by the Creator on the mind at the time of its union with the body, which metaphysicians call innate ideas ?

Div.—In order clearly to comprehend what can be said on that head, it is necessary that you bear in mind what I have said concerning the essence of the mind, when we treated of its union with the body. According to Mr. Locke, the mind is not informed by certain thoughts, neither does the primary attribute of the mind consist in thought.

I cannot subscribe to the above opinion—I think it more reasonable to hold, that from the very moment

of its existence, it is informed with certain ideas or perceptions—for our ideas are no more than the elements of thought ; whereas from those come the other operations of the mind, as judgment, discourse, &c. besides, that the human mind was created in order to compare, and to have certain notions of God, of itself, and of its moral duties, no person can doubt. How then could it acquire these primitive notions ? if, according to Locke, we are to consider the mind merely as a smooth table, our notions of the essence of the mind and the end of its creation are quite otherwise. Man was created to the image and likeness of his creator, and must undoubtedly have some ideas formed on the mind, at the time of his creation, at least habitual—nor can this habitual idea be other than the pure gift of the creator. These ideas are surely innate, on which are founded the first principles of the laws of nature. “ Les règles primitives du bien et du mal,” (said the author of the essay on metaphysics) “ le discernement du juste et de l’injuste, les maximes du droit naturel, les premiers devoirs de la créature envers Dieu, envers lui-même, envers le prochain, ont été gravés dans le cœur de l’homme par l’auteur de son être. Il les porte en dedans, il ne peut pas plus s’en dépouiller que de s’anéantir ; de là les remords de la conscience, qui quoiqu’en partie l’effet de l’éducation et de l’instruction, ont un fondement certain, et un principe constant dans sa nature, et dans le fond de son être ; de là l’impossibilité de l’ignorance invincible, au moins des premiers principes du droit naturel ; de là l’inexcusabilité, (s’il est permis de le dire) de la créature

" intelligente, lorsqu'elle n'accomplit pas la loi naturelle, et l'on peut dire de même de toute l'économie de la morale chrétienne. Dans le système des idées originaires des sens, tous ces principes perdent leur certitude et cessent d'être invariables, invincibles et imprescriptibles ; Ils n'ont d'autres appui et d'autre source que des idées factives, des conventions arbitraires, des connaissances qui n'étant pas nécessaires et attribuées à la nature de l'homme, à son état primordial et essentiel, ne sont que des accidents qui peuvent éprouver des variations, suivant le temps, le pays, et les circonstances." The idea of justice, of iniquity, or of good and evil, are naturally imprinted on our minds ; if not, let the time be assigned when we have not these ideas, and when we do not naturally put them in practice ; here it can be objected, that children have not these ideas of justice and injustice, or of good and of evil. The antecedent I distinguish—children have not these ideas, so as at that tender age, to be able to act on these principles, at a time when they are incapable of rendering acts of either kind—I freely grant the antecedent, that they have not these principles stamped on the mind, so as to be able to draw them into action according as they have occasion for such acts. In their conversation or mutual intercourse with men, I deny the antecedent ; they have in their infantile state, the modifications which agree to that state, impressed on the soul by the all-wise author of their existence. In like manner, at a more advanced age, the soul, which, as we have before discussed, acts in unison with the body, and expands its natural powers

according to the exigencies of the body, and its relative position (I mean whether placed among persons from whom it may by communication or not, receive these impressions—suppose among savages) manifests or develops those ideas, with which it has been impressed, so as to communicate to the person, (who is composed of body and soul,) a sense of good and a sense of evil, a sense of justice and injustice; and the idea of a Creator or Sovereign cause, even if he were to have no communication with any other mortal—this is what I conceive by an innate idea; by this exposition, the majesty, the goodness, and the providence of God are made manifest; this conception of an innate idea agrees with our conceptions of the essence of the soul and its union with the body, and shews from this innate desire of happiness, that a future state is attainable. Whatever may or can be said of the truth of either opinion, (concerning which I do not feel able to determine) 'tis a positive fact, that there never existed a rational being in any clime or country, free from the influence of prejudice or passion, but acknowledged in his heart the existence of a supreme being.—*Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine.*

Gent—Does not the system of the learned Malebranche seem preferable to that of Arnauld or others, on the subject of ideas in general?

Div.—'Tis my opinion that Malebranche in his system, went too far, and by soaring out of his sphere, gave his subject too much refinement; Mr. Arnauld on the other hand, by not going far enough, left the matter in greater obscurity. The system which

according to my conception of the matter, is more consonant to reason, to religion and truth, would be the medium between the extremes to which both these great men were insensibly carried.

Gent.—What is understood by what are called the habits of the human soul ?

Div.—A habit is the power or ability in man, of doing any thing by frequent repetition ; there are many species of habits, some supernatural and beyond the powers of human nature—those are not acquired by labor, or by exercise, or by repeated acts compared, but infused by God ; such are the acts of faith, hope, and charity ; others are natural, and acquired by reiterated acts, and are therefore called acquired. A natural habit is either corporal or spiritual ; the former is that which renders the bodily faculty more apt to practice certain actions, such as the habit of singing, or playing on musical instruments ; the latter is that which assists the spiritual faculty. The spiritual habits belong to the mind, either inasmuch as it has knowledge or affection ; the former are referred to the intellect, whose province is knowledge, and are therefore called spiritual ; the latter belong to the will, whose province is to desire what is good, to love, &c. and are called moral.

Gent.—In what does the nature of those habits consist ?

Div.—On that head philosophers are of opinion, that corporeal habits are happily explained by the free motion of the animal spirits, flowing in on certain parts of the body, for the more frequently they are thrown into those parts, the more easily they make

a way for themselves, in which they more quickly flow afterwards, the more easily are the motions of the same parts renewed to action. 'Tis no easy task to define the nature of the spiritual habits, neither are the opinions of the learned uniform on the subject. Most modern philosophers affirm that those spiritual habits arise, or are placed in certain corporeal affections, viz: in certain impressions made on the brain, (the use of which organ is to give off nine pairs of nerves, and the spinal marrow, from which thirty-one pairs more proceed, through whose means the various senses are performed, and muscular motion excited,) in the free concurrence of the animal spirits, in an easy and expeditious flexion of the nerves and muscles, and by removing those obstacles which impede the exercise of the spiritual faculty. 1st—They say we can have no spiritual habits except when the brain has a certain disposition, viz: a certain solidity joined with a certain flexibility; and for that reason it is that children have not these habits, on account of the softer and less elastic constitution of the organs. 2d—The habits of the mind are increased and strengthened in proportion as the impressions of the brain become more open or distinct, when the animal spirits freely flow through those impressions made upon the brain.

The habits of every substance are nothing else than the substance itself affected by a certain mode; but 'tis evidently absurd to affirm that the habits of the mind exist in the body, or the habits of one substance reside in another of quite a different nature and substance. To make the habits of the mind be consti-

tuted in the body, would be virtually to identify the substance of the mind with that of the body, than which nothing more extravagant could be imagined. Again—let us suppose that two men lose their senses at the same time, one of whom lived in the habitual state of grace, or love of God, the other in a habitual state of sin; let us suppose in both, that all these impressions of the brain are obliterated, so that both die in that state. According to the system of those philosophers, he who lived in the love and fear of God would not be saved, nor would the other be condemned; which indeed, is not only contrary to the principles of christian philosophy, but also against christian faith, to which it is impious that any system of philosophy would be preferred.

Gent.—What are we to understand by indifferent acts? is indifference reconcilable with our freedom, or that willingness in which there is no coercion?

Div.—There are two kinds of indifference, the one passive, viz: while the will remains suspended from every act, this passive indifference does not belong to the essence of liberty, but is peculiar to all inanimate beings; the other kind is *active indifference*, or the power of self-determination, and is the essence of liberty in man, and in all intellectual beings; by this the will has the power to act and not to act; man thereby has the dominion of himself, and is perfect master of his actions. This active indifference is then perfectly reconcilable with man's freedom, which, or as it is called free will, is specifically a power or faculty of the will to act and not to act.

Gent.—What kind of necessity is opposed to the free will, or that active indifference you mention?

Div.—Absolute necessity excludes liberty of indifference.—consequent and hypothetical necessity do not; neither is it excluded by the necessity or coercion of a law or precept; the reason is because that necessity which is not absolute, is extrinsic of the will or liberty, nor does it affect the interior manner of acting freely. No motives can then impel a man irresistably to act, however powerful; they can at the most, but induce him to act or deter him from acting; neither can external coercion destroy his liberty. Man is therefore in his actions perfectly free, which freedom is clearly reconcilable with the prescience of God, with gratuitous predestination, and predefinition with the last practical judgment, and with the impeccability of Christ and the Saints. This freedom which is the gift of the Creator, man cannot lose by his transgressions against the rule of reason, by which his actions should be guided, being the eternal law of God; and as for the observance of the law, eternal happiness will be his reward—so for the transgressions thereof, he is as justly punished.

Gent.—What, pray, is meant by the axiom, *bonum est ex integra causa, malum, vero, ex singulis defectibus*?

Div.—It means that the defect of one of the requisites to goodness is sufficient to constitute an act which is morally bad.

Gent.—What disposition of the will is then necessary to a good act?

Div.—'Tis required indeed, that the honesty of the virtue be the motive, which principally would induce a person to action, or that good be the

end as well as the inducement for which the act is done. A direct inclination which virtually continues, may suffice for the goodness of the act; hence an involuntary distraction at the time of prayer, does not deprive the act of its virtue, but an indirect or interpretative will inclination is sufficient to deprive an act of its virtue, because the will should be in every manner averse to evil, i. e. to every sinful act. Though we may will an evil act directly and in itself, still 'tis never on account of its evil, that the evil is willed or performed, which is the meaning of the axiom "*nemo intendens malum operatur.*"

Gent.—You have just now said, "*though we may will an evil act*" as may imply a species of permission, I beg to know whether it be permitted at any time to will evil?

Div.—Even if good were to follow, 'tis never permitted to do evil; the meaning I intended to convey by that expression, was that which the axiom itself expresses, viz: that evil is never done for its own sake.

Gent.—Though it may not be expressly permitted, I should think it cannot be criminal, when the cause of God, the good of our neighbour, or the good of religion be in question, to tell an inoffensive lie, or to do some act which may not be formally against the rule of reason.

Div.—There can be no deviation from the truth, which will not be found opposed to the sanctity of Almighty God, who is the author of truth and truth itself. There can therefore, be no reason or motive however holy or well intended, sufficient to excuse a lie,

even if it were to save one's own life, because to live by the sacrifice of truth, would be properly not life, but a spiritual death; I do not say, however, but the circumstances or the smallness of the matter might, when considered, excuse the act from being mortal or a deadly sin, but I say, that under no consideration, can a wilful deviation from the truth be excused from the guilt of sin, and that it is often no easy matter to determine when it can be said to be only venial.

Gent.—What do you understand by the axiom, in “evil acts a direct and indirect will are equivalent?”

Div.—The meaning is, that they are equivalent, inasmuch as that an act be sinful, but not equally so when compared with another act. Hence an act sinful in itself, or which has accompanying it, that which constitutes a sin, if not directly voluntary cannot be considered of equal guilt or as great a sin as that which is directly voluntary.

Gent.—Is there then a certain or fixed rule by which we can discover a sinful act, from that which is not so?

Div.—The decalogue is the broad rule given by Almighty God to man, by which, according to the powers with which he is endowed, man's actions should be measured; I say according to the powers with which he has been endowed, because if a man be born blind, 'twill not be imputed to him as a crime if his knowledge be not from reading; but having the use of all the other powers, such as intellect, will memory, &c. &c. 'twill be criminal in him if he turn not these powers, both of mind and body, to

that use and end for which he has received them from his creator, viz: to love God and to serve him. From St. Augustin we have the following rule, by which any sinful act can be easily determined: which he called, *dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem dei eternam*. A saying or expression or an action or a desire are against the eternal law of God.

Gent.—Which are the conditions required, that an act may be said to be voluntary in another, or that the effect be voluntary in the cause?

Div.—Three following:—1st. That the effect by some manner would follow from that cause, either directly or indirectly. 2d. That the agent hath foreseen, or could and ought to foresee and apprehend that such an effect would probably happen from that cause. 3d. That the cause was founded on no just reason. But in order that the effect be not only voluntary, but also culpable, 'tis required in that case, that the agent would be under some obligation to prevent the future effect.

Gent.—What is the meaning of the following axiom? one act may have two effects, one of which may be solely in the intention of the agent, but the other by no means intended.

Div.—'Tis thus explained: when the reason of giving the cause with a good effect, in these circumstances, prevails against the reason for preventing the bad effect, one can act or give the cause, while he intends that the good effect only would follow, and not the bad effect. Thus a soldier may lawfully, and ought to stand at his post, though from his perilous situation he is in danger of death.

Gent.—Is it not an axiom, that an effect only voluntary in the cause, is not more voluntary than the cause itself?

Div.—What I understand by that axiom is, that whilst the cause can be considered only a venial evil, in consequence of the indeliberation of the agent, or the imperfection of the inclination; then the effect only voluntary in that cause, can be only a venial, which, with full deliberation, could not be excused from being a mortal sin; thus, if from the negligence of a servant, through defect of more deliberation, and which indeliberation (the circumstances being considered) is only venial, the house would be consumed by fire; this act of the servant cannot be considered mortal, I say, for the want of sufficient deliberation, and the indeliberation being venial.

Gent.—What is understood by a human act?

Div.—'Tis an act which proceeds from the deliberate will of a person, or which is directed by the judgment of his reason; deliberation is however of two kinds, formal and interpretative; 'tis formal when the mind, with a sufficient light of reason to distinguish between moral good and evil, actually judges or deliberates on any action. 'Tis interpretative when the mind so enlightened, could and ought to use deliberation. To the sense of a human act, either kind of deliberation is sufficient; and so that which proceeds from vincible ignorance or inadvertence, can be called a human act; if there be neither kind of deliberation attending it, it is not a human act. Thus the first movements of the mind, or what are called *motus primò primi*, which are without any deli-

bération, and by which motions are excited in the body, are not human acts. Hence the acts of children before they arrive at an age to use their reason, and the acts of those who have lost their reason, are not human acts, properly speaking. Thus what are strictly called human, are different from the acts of a person considered as man indeterminately to the former but not to the latter, the deliberation of reason is required.

Gent.—To merit or demerit, what kind of liberty is necessary? does liberty from coercion suffice?

Div.—Liberty of indifference and from consequent necessity, are absolutely requisite to merit or demerit.

Gent.—Does not St. Augustin in many places, say that liberty of indifference is required? nay, in his book to Julian, Ch. 35. he admits the necessity of sin!

Div.—No external power can force man's free will, or that active indifference which he received from his Creator—force, indeed can restrain the body from action, but the will remains free; absolute necessity destroys the freedom of action, because it is opposed to it—they are ideas which exclude each other. I do not recollect to have met in the writings of St. Augustin, any passage, which, if properly understood, can convey the above meaning. I freely admit, that from a want of truly comprehending the style, the depth and conciseness of his reasoning, many things have been imputed to him, as doctrine which he never taught. From the following passage which is found in his third book on free will, Ch. 18. 'tis manifest he clearly asserts, that the liberty of active indifference is necessary to a formal sin, or rather to sin formally:

" *Hoc brevissimum tene;*" said he, "*quæcunque ista causa est voluntatis, si ei non potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur. . . . quis enim peccat in eo, quod nullo modo caveri potest? peccatur autem, caveri igitur potest. Et lib. de duabus animabus, Ch. 11. peccatum est voluntas consequendi vel retinendi quod justitia vetat, et undè liberum est abstinere. . . . nemi-nem vituperatione suppliciove dignum qui id non faciat quod facere non potest. . . . nonne ista cantant et in montibus pastores, et in theatris poetæ, et indocti in circulis, et docti in bibliothecis. Et. Cap. 12. dicere peccati reum teneri quemquam qui non facit, quod facere non potest summæ iniquitatis est et insanix.*" Hence I conclude that impotence, impossibility, or absolute or antecedent necessity, can excuse from a new and formal sin, because they exclude the liberty of indifference, which to sin formally, is very necessary.

Gent.—What is understood by a passion of the mind?

Div.—'Tis an act of the sensitive appetite, pursuing good or avoiding evil of a sensible kind, being directed by the fantasy, and causing a certain change in the body, on that account the acts of the sensitive appetite are called passions.

Gent.—How many are the passions of the mind?

Div.—They are eleven in number, viz: six in the concupiscible appetite, and five in the irascible. The following are those of the concupiscible appetite, viz: love and hatred, concupiscence or desire and flight, joy and sorrow. The five following belong to

the irascible appetite, viz : hope and despair, fear, boldness and anger ; love and hatred are simply concerning some sensible good and evil abstractedly, i. e. whether present or absent. Desire and flight respect good or evil as absent. Joy and sorrow are concerning some present good or evil ; hope is concerning a good, loved, arduous, absent and possible ; despair respects an absent good, apprehended as impossible, or too difficult to be obtained. Fear and boldness are concerning some great and impending evil, being not yet present. According to St. Thomas, quest. 23. art. 3. anger has no opposite passion, but arises from a great or arduous and present evil, which it seeks to repel. St. Augustin defines all the passions by *love*, because love is the origin of all the other passions, because whoever hates evil flies from it, and loves the good, which is opposed to it.

Gent.—I found it some where asserted, that all the works even of just men in a state of fallen nature, are so many sins, on account of the vice of latent pride and concupiscence, by which all their acts are infected ; though they are not imputed to those having faith, but only to the unfaithful.

Div.—I before remarked that this was the doctrine of Luther, on which he held a public *Thesis* ; but that paradox of reforming note, we find justly condemned by the holy council of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 7. 25. the contrary to that strange doctrine is of faith, and is proved from different passages in the sacred scripture. Job, Ch. 1. v. 22. *in omnibus his non peccavit Job.* In all these things Job sinned not, &c.

videant opera vestra bona, that they may see your good works, &c. St. Mat. Ch. 5. v. 16. what can be said from the prophet Isaias, Ch. 64. v. 6. has no reference to this question ; the prophet there speaks only of certain jewish sacrifices, oblations and other legal observances In like manner, is misunderstood the word *omnes* or all from St. Paul to the Romans, Ch. 3. v. 12. it does not literally signify all as the paradoxical reformers would have it, 'tis given to signify many. In like manner in his epistle to the Philippians, he has, "*omnes quæ sua sunt querunt*," where undoubtedly by the word all he does not comprehend himself, nor the rest of the apostles.

Gent.—From whence have human acts their degree of goodness or of mal propence ?

Div.—There are three principles of morality.—1st. That respecting the object.—2d. That which regards the end, and 3d. That which respects the circumstance. By the object is understood, the thing or the person, concerning which the act is ; thus, the object of theft is the property of another, man of homicide, and any thing holy of sacrilege.

Gent.—What is here understood by the end ?

Div.—Respecting the end, 'tis necessary to remark that 'tis not the end of the act that is understood, but the end the agent proposes in the manner of acting ; 'tis specifically from the end the agent proposes, the morality of the act depends or its immorality ; this therefore is a circumstance. The pure love of God and our own eternal happiness should be the end proposed in all our actions—we were created for that

end. From what I have here remarked, it can be easily conceived, that all human acts take their species of goodness or of malice from the object, the end, and the circumstances, and it follows, that those sins are distinct in species, whose object or circumstances are specifically distinct; but the object and circumstances should be considered specifically distinct, when they are repugnant to right reason, and the eternal law diversely.

Gent.—How is this diverse repugnance or specific distinction known?

Div.—By these rules.—1st. The sins which are repugnant to different virtues, are specifically distinct; for example, theft and fornication, the former is repugnant to justice, and the latter to chastity; because as every virtue has an appropriate and peculiar goodness, the opposite vice must have a specific and proper malice.—2ly. These sins are specifically different between themselves, which are repugnant to the same virtue after a different manner—one by excess, the other by defect; thus presumption and despair, though differing in species, are opposed to the same virtue, viz: to hope; avarice and prodigality are equally opposed to liberality.—3ly. These sins which are repugnant to the same virtue after the same manner, are still specifically distinct between themselves, if they be repugnant to the same virtue diversely. Thus, theft and rapine, detraction and contumely, are specifically different, though they are all after the same manner, opposed to the virtue of justice, viz: by defect.—4ly. These sins are specifi-

cally distinguished, which are opposed to those different laws and precepts, given from a formal and different motive ; because these laws and precepts have for their end—the honesty of the virtue different ; so the sins opposed to them have a malice in species different. By the same rule we can know when the circumstances are of a different species, or change their species. Thus in the scandalous theft of a holy thing, the circumstances of the sacred thing, and of scandal, are mutually and specifically different, and change the theft to the reason of a different species. The numerical distinction of sinful acts, is taken from the plurality of the acts and of the objects, for which we have two rules ; the first is, that many acts of the same species of evil which do not coalesce in the same sinful act, can constitute only as many sins in number as there are acts. The second is, that one act having many objects of the same species not uniting in one object, contain as many sins, solely distinct in number, as there are objects. Thus a person, who, by a single explosion of a bombard, has killed three men, is guilty of three sins of homicide, distinct in number.

Gent.—Is it not almost impossible to live up to the refinement of those rules which are laid down by christian Divines, for the government of our religious and moral conduct ? who has observed these rules ?

Div.—Christian Divines or theologians do no more than simplify or explain the law of God, (which all men are indispensably obliged to observe,) by pointing out such acts as are conformable or repugnant to

that eternal rule of reason. In every rank and station of life, there have been men who found it neither impossible nor difficult to observe these divine ordinances, from the conviction, that on it alone depend man's comfort and independence here below, and his eternal felicity hereafter.

THE END.

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